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Research and Publications

MY RESEARCH PAPERS

God Can Do Otherwise: A Defense of Act Contingency in Leibniz's Mature Period 

This paper locates a source of contingency for Leibniz in the fact that God can do otherwise, absolutely speaking. This paper argues that the supposition that God does otherwise, and creates a sub-optimal world, implies for Leibniz (at least) that God would not be praiseworthy, which is an absurd implication—or a violation of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR)—but is not, strictly speaking, an inconsistency—or a violation of the principle of contradiction (POC). It is in this sense absolutely possible for God to do otherwise. This paper then defends this source of contingency against the objection that this account of contingency is inconsistent with Leibniz's own understanding of God as the ens perfectissimum, or the most perfect being. 

God Can Do Otherwise

Composition without Parts: Leibniz on Divine Simplicity

This paper re-constructs Leibniz's account of divine simplicity through an examination of the simplicity of monads in general. Since God is a monad for Leibniz, the simplicity of monads in general ought to apply to the simplicity of God. This paper then argues that Leibniz's account of divine simplicity allows for the reality of divine choice which enables the possibility of God's robust freedom and genuine praiseworthiness. Finally, this paper argues that Leibniz's version of divine simplicity is arguably still compatible with the original motivations behind the classic doctrine, including motivations from divine aseity and greatness.  

In Progress
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Contingency in Leibniz's Philosophical Theology 

This paper orients the reader to the issue of contingency in Leibniz's philosophical theology. The paper argues that Leibniz's mature 'moral necessity' account of contingency is Leibniz's most promising source of contingency. This is because other accounts, including 'per se' and 'infinite analysis,' either struggle to clearly secure Leibniz's conditions on free action, or they fail to explain why the contrary of 'God chooses the best' does not imply a contradiction. 

Under Review
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MY PRESENTATIONS

Comments on Joshua Horn (UW-Stevens Point) "Theodicy and Jurisprudence" Society for the Philosophy of Religion, Hilton Head, SC, March 2024
 

Comments on Joseph Orttung (Cornell) "Possibility and Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles" APA Pacific Division, Portland, OR, March 2024
 

“Exploring the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity,” Undergraduate Philosophy Club, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, November 9th, 2022
 

“God Can Do Otherwise: A Defense of Act Contingency in Leibniz’s Mature Period,” Fink Award Ceremony, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, April 22nd, 2022
 

“How to Understand Counterfactuals Involving God for Leibniz,” Kentucky Philosophical Association (KPA), Morehead State University, Morehead, KY, April 9th, 2022
 

Comments on Kristen Irwin (Loyola), “Indifference and Universalism: Leibniz on
Religious Toleration,” APA Central Division, Chicago, IL, February 25th, 2022

 

“God Can Do Otherwise: A Defense of Leibniz’s Neglected Solution to Necessitarianism,” Leibniz Society of North America (LSNA), University of Illinois at Chicago (Zoom), January 16th, 2021
 

Comments on Fabio Malfara (UWO), “Malebranche’s Supposed Idealism,” Western E-vent in Early Modern Philosophy, University of Western Ontario (Zoom), June 4th, 2020

“God Can Do Otherwise: A Defense of Act Contingency in Leibniz’s Theodicy” Kentucky Philosophical Association (KPA), Morehead State University, April 4th, 2020 [COVID-19 cancellation]

Comments on Fabio Malfara (UWO), “Malebranche’s Supposed Idealism”, Princeton Graduate Conference in the History of Philosophy, March 14th, 2020 [COVID-19 cancellation]

“Leibniz, Adams, and the Necessity of God’s Choice,” guest lecture in Dai Heide, Topics in Epistemology and Metaphysics: Philosophical Theology, Simon Fraser University, July 4th, 2019

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